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ABSTRACT
Over the past few years, online bullying and aggression have be-
come increasingly prominent, and manifested in many dierent
forms on social media. However, there is little work analyzing the
characteristics of abusive users and what distinguishes them from
typical social media users. In this paper, we start addressing this
gap by analyzing tweets containing a great large amount of abusive-
ness. We focus on a Twitter dataset revolving around the Gamergate
controversy, which led to many incidents of cyberbullying and cy-
beraggression on various gaming and social media platforms. We
study the properties of the users tweeting about Gamergate, the
content they post, and the dierences in their behavior compared
to typical Twitter users.
We nd that while their tweets are often seemingly about aggres-
sive and hateful subjects, “Gamergaters” do not exhibit common
expressions of online anger, and in fact primarily dier from typ-
ical users in that their tweets are less joyful. They are also more
engaged than typical Twitter users, which is an indication as to
how and why this controversy is still ongoing. Surprisingly, we
nd that Gamergaters are less likely to be suspended by Twitter,
thus we analyze their properties to identify dierences from typical
users and what may have led to their suspension. We perform an
unsupervised machine learning analysis to detect clusters of users
who, though currently active, could be considered for suspension
since they exhibit similar behaviors with suspended users. Finally,
we conrm the usefulness of our analyzed features by emulating the
Twitter suspension mechanism with a supervised learning method,
achieving very good precision and recall.
1 INTRODUCTION
Abuse on social media is becoming a pressing issue. Over the past
few years, social networks have not only been targeted by bots
and fraudsters [2, 31, 36], but have also been used as a platform for
harassing and trolling other individuals [29]. Detecting and mit-
igating such activities presents important challenges since abuse
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performed by human-controlled accounts tends to be less homoge-
neous than the one performed by bots, making it hard to identify
the characteristics that distinguish them from non-abusive attacks
(and detect them). Recent work showed that human-controlled
accounts involved in harassment actually present degrees of syn-
chronized activity [16]. However, no systematic measurement has
been performed to understand what distinguishes a social network
account behaving in an abusive way from a typical one. Such an
understanding is crucial to enable eective mitigation and help
social network operators to detect and block these accounts.
Roadmap. In this paper, we start addressing this gap by perform-
ing a large-scale comparative study of abusive accounts on Twitter,
aiming to understand their characteristics and how they dier from
typical accounts. We collect a large dataset of tweets related to the
Gamergate (GG) controversy [4], which after two years since its
start has evolved into a fairly mature, pseudo-political movement
that is thought to encompass semi-organized campaigns of hate
and harassment by its adherents, known as Gamergaters (GGers),
against women in particular. Then, we explore the dierences be-
tween the GG-related accounts identied as abusive, and random
Twitter accounts, investigate how these dierences lead to dispro-
portional suspension rates by Twitter, and discuss possible causes
of these dierences. We also look at accounts of users that were
deleted by their owner and not by Twitter. Further, we cluster GG
accounts that exhibit similar behavior, aiming to identify groups
of similar accounts that should have been suspended by Twitter
but are instead still active. Based on the ndings of our clustering,
we reason about what may have driven Twitter to not suspend
them. Finally, we test the performance of a supervised method to
automatically suspend Twitter users based on the various features
analyzed.
Findings. In summary, we discover that users involved in Gamer-
gate were already-existing Twitter users probably drawn to the
controversy, which might be the reason why GG exploded on Twit-
ter in the rst place. While the subject of their tweets is seemingly
aggressive and hateful, GGers do not exhibit common expressions
of online anger, and in fact primarily dier from random users in
that their tweets are less joyful. We nd that despite their clearly
anti-social behavior, GGers tend to have more friends and followers
than random users and being more engaging in the platform may
have allowed this controversy to continue until now. Surprisingly,
we nd that GGers are disproportionally not suspended from Twit-
ter in comparison to random users, which is rather unexpected
given their hateful and aggressive postings. Suspended GG users
expressed more aggressive and repulsive emotions, oensive lan-
guage, and interestingly, more joy than suspended random users,
and their high posting and engaging activity may have delayed
their suspension from Twitter. Also GGers who deleted their ac-
count demonstrated the most activity in comparison to other users
(deleted or suspended), exhibited signs of distress, fear, and sad-
ness. They have probably showed these emotions through their
high posting activity lled with anger, reduced joy, and negative
sentiment. Such users have small social ego-networks which may
have been unsupportive or too small to help them before deleting
their accounts.
Paper Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
The next section reviews related work on measuring abusive be-
haviors on online platforms. Section 3 introduces our dataset and
the steps taken for cleaning and preparing it for analysis, then, in
Section 4, we analyze the behavioral patterns exhibited by GGers,
and compare them to random Twitter users. In Section 5, we discuss
how users get suspended on Twitter, dierences observed between
GGers and random users, reasons for deviating from the expected
rates, and a basic eort to emulate Twitter’s suspension mechanism.
In Section 6 we discuss our ndings and conclude.
2 RELATEDWORK
We now review related work on studying/detecting oensive, abu-
sive, aggressive or bullying content on social media sources. Chen et
al. [7] aim to detect oensive content, as well as, potential oensive
users based on YouTube comments. Both Yahoo Finance [10, 25]
and Yahoo Answers [19] have been used as a source of information
for detecting hate and/or abusive content. More specically, [19]
studied a Community-based Question-Answering (CQA) site and
nds that users tend to ag abusive content in an overwhelmingly
correct way.
Cyberbullying has also attracted a lot of attention lately, for
instance [3], [17] and [18] focus on Twitter, Ask.fm, and Instagram,
respectively, to detect existing bullying cases out of text sources. [3]
considers a variety of features, i.e., user, text, and network-based,
to distinguish bullies and aggressors from typical Twitter users. In
addition to text sources, [18] also tries to associate an image’s topic
(e.g., drugs, celebrity, sports, etc) with cyberbullying events. In [9],
the cyberbullying phenomenon is further decomposed to specic
sensitive topics, i.e., race, culture, sexuality, and intelligence, by
analyzing YouTube comments extracted from controversial videos.
A study of specic cyberbullying cases, e.g., threats and insults, is
also conducted in [35] by considering Dutch posts extracted from
Ask.fm. Apart from cyberbullying, they also study specic user
behaviors: harasser, victim, and bystander-defender or bystander-
assistant who support the victim or the harasser, respectively. In
follow-up work [29], the authors exploit Twitter messages to detect
bullying cases which are specically related to the gender bully-
ing phenomenon. Finally, in [8], YouTube users are characterized
based on a “bulliness” score. The rise of cyberbullying, and abusive
incidents in general, is also evident in online game communities.
Since these communities are widely used by people of all ages, such
a phenomenon has attracted the interest of the research commu-
nity. For instance, [20] studies cyberbullying and toxic behaviors
in team competition online games in an eort to detect, prevent,
and counter-act toxic behavior. [12] investigates the prevalence
of sexism in online game communities nding personality traits,
demographic variables, and levels of game-play predicted sexist
attitudes towards women who play video games. Overall, previous
work considers various attributes to distinguish between normal
and abusive behavior, like text-based attributes, e.g., URLs and
Bag of Words (BoW), lexicon-based (oensive word dictionary), or
user/activity based attributes, e.g., number of friends/followers and
users’ account age. Our work aims to use such attributes to study
and understand the dierent behavioral patterns between random
and Gamergate Twitter users, while shedding light on how such
dierences aect their suspension and deletion rates on Twitter.
Analysis of Gamergate. To create an abuse-related dataset, i.e., a
dataset containing abusive behavior with high probability, previ-
ous works rely on a number of words (i.e., seed words) which are
highly related with the manifestation of abusive/aggressive events.
In this sense, a popular term that can serve as a seed word is the
#GamerGate hashtag which is one of the most well documented
large-scale instances of bullying/aggressive behavior we are aware
of [22]. The Gamergate controversy stemmed from alleged im-
proprieties in video game journalism, which quickly grew into a
larger campaign centered around sexism and social justice. With
individuals on both sides of the controversy using it, and extreme
cases of bullying and aggressive behavior associated with it (e.g.,
direct threats of rape and murder), #GamerGate can serve as a rela-
tively unambiguous hashtag associated with texts that are likely to
involve abusive/aggressive behavior from a fairly mature, hateful
online community. In [23], the author shows that #GamerGate can
be likened to hooliganism, i.e., a leisure-centered aggression were
fans are organized in groups to attack another group’s members.
Also, [13] aims to detect toxicity on Twitter, considering #Gamer-
Gate to collect a sucient number of harassment-related posts.
In this paper, we also study a number of abusive users involved
in this controversy via #GamerGate. However, we are the rst to
investigate the attributes characterizing these users with respect
to their Twitter account status (active, suspended, deleted), and
to perform an unsupervised and supervised analysis of suspicious
users for possible suspension.
3 DATASET
In this section, we present the data used throughout the rest of the
paper, as well as the two prepocessing steps: spam removal and
dataset cleaning.
3.1 Data Collection
The data used in the next sections were collected between June
and August 2016 using the Twitter Streaming API [34] which gives
access to 1% of all tweets. Data returned from the Twitter API
include either user-related info, e.g., users’ follower/friends count,
total number of posted, liked and favorited tweets, or text-related,
e.g., the text itself, hashtags, mentions, etc. Here, two sets of tweets
were gathered: (i) a baseline dataset with 1M random tweets, and
(ii) a Gamergate-related dataset with 650k tweets.
Gamergate dataset. To build a dataset containing an adequate
number of bullying / aggressive instances, we initially selected
(a) Sentiment distribution. (b) Joy distribution. (c) Emoticons distribution. (d) Uppercases distribution.
Figure 1: Average CDF distribution of (a) Sentiment, (b) Joy, (c) Emoticons, (d) Uppercases in baseline and Gamergate datasets.
#GamerGate as a seed word. From the 1% sample of public tweets,
we selected only those containing this seed word and performed
a snowball sampling of other hashtags likely associated with abu-
sive behavior. Thus, we included tweets which contained hashtags
that appeared in the same tweets as #GamerGate (the keywords
list was updated on a daily basis - more details about the data
collection process can be found in our previous work [4]). Over-
all, we collected 308 hashtags during the data collection period.
After a manual examination of these hashtags, we veried that
they indeed contain a number of abusive words or hashtags, e.g.,
#InternationalOendAFeministDay, #IStandWithHateSpeech, and
#KillAllNiggers.
Baseline (random) dataset. To compare the hate-related dataset
with cases which are less prone to contain abusive content, and
for the same time period, we also crawled a random sample of 1M
tweets which serve as a baseline.
3.2 Preprocessing
Next, we focus on the tasks performed to make our data suitable
for analysis, cleaning text, and removing noise, and dealing with
other erroneous data.
Cleaning. We remove stop words, numbers, and punctuation
marks. Also, we normalize text by eliminating repetitive char-
acters which users often use to express their feelings with more
intensity (e.g., the word ‘hellooo’ is converted to ‘hello’). Users
tend to add extra vowels in words to show emphasis or intense
emotion. So, based on such an assumption, initially we remove
all the duplicate vowels (only when they are above 2) of a word,
if any. Then, we check for the existence of the “new” word in the
Wikipedia database. Such process is repeated for all the possible
combinations when more than one vowels is duplicate. If none of
the “new” words is available in the Wikipedia database, we keep
the initial one.
Spam removal. Even though extensive work has been done on
spam detection in social media, e.g., [31, 36], Twitter is still plagued
by spam accounts [6]. Two main indications of spam behavior
are [36]: (i) the large number of hashtags within a user’s posts, as it
permits the broader broadcast of such posts, and (ii) the population
of large amounts of (almost) similar posts. Based on the 2-month
dataset collected from Twitter, the distributions of hashtags and
duplications of posts are examined to detect the cuto-limit above
which a user will be characterized as spammer and consequently
will be removed from the dataset.
Hashtags. Studying the hashtags distribution, we observe that
users use on average 0 to 17 hashtags. Building on this, we examine
various cuttos to select a proper one above which we can charac-
terize a user as spammer. In the end, after a manual inspection we
observed that in most of the cases where the number of hashtags
was 5 or more, the text was mostly related to inappropriate content.
So, the limit of 5 hashtags is used, and consequently we remove
those users that have more than 5 hashtags on average in their
tweets.
Duplications. In many cases a user’s texts are (almost) the same,
with only the listed mentioned users modied. So, in addition
to the previously mentioned cleaning processes, we also remove
all mentions. Then, to estimate the similarity of a user’s posts
we proceed with the Levenshtein distance [24] which counts the
minimum number of single-character edits needed to convert one
string into another, averaging it out over all pairs of their tweets.
Initially, for each user we calculate their intra-tweets similarity.
Thus, for a user with x tweets, we arrive at a set of n similarity
scores, where n = x (x − 1)/2, and an average intra-tweet similarity
per user. Then, all users with average intra-tweets similarity above
0.8 (about 5%) are excluded from the dataset.
4 COMPARING GAMERGATERS WITH
TYPICAL USERS
In this section, we compare the baseline and GG-related dataset
across two dimensions, considering emotional and activity attributes.
4.1 Emotional characteristics of Gamergaters
Sentiment. To detect sentiment, we use the SentiStrength tool [30],
which estimates the positive and negative sentiment (on a [-4, 4]
scale) in short texts. Figure 1a plots the CDF of sentiment of tweets
for the two datasets. We note that around 25% of tweets are positive
for both types of users. However, GGers post tweets with a gener-
ally more negative sentiment (a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test rejects the null hypothesis with D = 0.101, p < 0.01). In par-
ticular, around 25% of GG tweets are negative compared to only
around 15% for baseline users. This observation is in line with the
GG dataset containing a large number of oensive posts.
Emotions. We also extract the sentiment values for six emotions
using a similar approach to [5]: anger, disgust, fear, joy, sadness,
(a) Account age distribution. (b) Number of posts distribution. (c) Favorites distribution. (d) Lists distribution.
(e) Mentions distribution. (f) Friends distribution. (g) Followers distribution.
Figure 2: CDF distribution of (a) Account age, (b) Number of Posts, (c) Favorites, (d) Lists, (e) Mentions, (f) Friends, (g) Followers.
and surprise which, based on Ekman et al. [11], are considered as
primary emotions. Also known as basic, they are a xed number of
emotions which we experience instantly as a response to a pleasant
(or unpleasant) stimulus. Figure 1b shows the CDF of joy, where we
reject the null hypothesis that the two distributions are the same
(D = 0.089, p < 0.01). We are unable to reject the null hypothesis
for the other ve primary emotions. This is particularly interesting
because it contradicts the narrative that GGers are posting virulent
content out of anger. Instead, GGers appear to be less joyful. This is
a subtle but important dierence: GGers are not necessarily angry,
but they are apparently less happy.
Oensive. Looking a bit deeper, we compare the oensiveness
score that tweets have been marked with according to the hatebase
(HB) [15] crowdsourced dictionary. Each word included in HB is
scored on a [0, 100] scale which indicates how hateful it is. Though
the visual dierence is small, GGers use more hateful words than a
baseline user (D = 0.006, p < 0.01).
Emoticons and Uppercase. Two common ways to express emo-
tion in social media are emoticons and “shouting” by using all
capital letters. Based on the nature of GG, we initially suspected
that there would be a relatively small amount of emoticon usage,
but many tweets that would be shouting in all uppercase letters.
However, as we can see in Figures 1c and 1d, which plot the CDF of
the average number (per user) of emoticon usage and all uppercase
tweets, respectively, this is not the case. GG and baseline users
tend to use emoticons similarly (we are unable to reject the null
hypothesis with D = 0.028 and p = 0.96). However, GGers tend to
use all uppercase less than baseline users (D = 0.212, p < 0.01). As
seen previously, GGers are quite savvy Twitter users, and generally
speaking, shouting tends to be ignored. Thus, one explanation is
that GGers avoid such a simple “tell” as posting in all uppercase to
ensure their message is not so easily dismissed.
4.2 Activity characteristics of Gamergaters
Account age. An underlying question about GG is what started
rst: participants’ use of Twitter or their participation in the contro-
versy. I.e., did Gamergate draw people to Twitter, or were Twitter
users drawn to Gamergate? Figure 2a plots the distribution of ac-
count age for GG participants and baseline Twitter users. For the
most part, GGers tend to have older accounts than baseline Twitter
users (D = 0.20142, p < 0.01, mean = 982.94 days, median = 788
days, STD = 772.49 days). The mean, median, and STD values for
the baseline users are 834.39, 522, and 652.42 days, respectively.
Overall, the oldest account in our dataset belongs to a GG user,
while only 26.64% of baseline users have account ages older than
the mean value of the GGers. The gure indicates that GG users
were existing Twitter users that were drawn to the controversy.
In fact, their familiarity with Twitter could be the reason that GG
exploded in the rst place.
Posts, Favorites, and Lists. Figure 2b plots the distribution of the
number of tweets made by GGers and baseline users. GGers are
signicantly more active than baseline Twitter users (D = 0.352,
p < 0.01). The mean, median and STD values for the GG (random)
users is 135, 618 (49, 342), 48, 587 (9, 429), and 185, 997 (97, 457) posts,
respectively. Figures 2c and 2d show the CDFs of favorites and lists
declared in users’ proles. We note that in the median case, GGers
are similar to baseline users, but looking at the 30% of users in the
tail of each distribution, GG users have more favorites and lists
than baseline users.
Mentions. Figure 2e shows that GGers tend to make more men-
tions within their posts, which can be due to the higher number of
direct attacks in contrast to the baseline users.
Followers and Friends. GGers are involved in what we would
typically think of as anti-social behavior. However, this is somewhat
at odds with the fact that their activity takes place primarily on
social media. To get an idea of how “social” GGers are, Figures 2f
and 2g plot the distribution of friends and followers for GGers
and baseline users. We observe that GGers tend to have more
friends and followers than baseline twitter users (D = 0.34 and
0.39, p < 0.01 for both). Although this result might be initially
counter-intuitive, the truth of the matter is that GG was born on
social media, and is a very clear “us vs. them” situation. This leads
to easy identication of in-group membership, and thus heightens
the likelihood of relationship formation.
5 SUSPENSION OF GAMERGATE ACCOUNTS
BY TWITTER
In the previous section, we studied users involved in the GG contro-
versy and identied attributes that distinguish them from random
Twitter users, either regarding the way they write tweets and the
sentiment they carry, or their embeddedness in the Twitter social
network. In fact, we found that GGers post tweets that are more
negative, less joyful, and more hateful or oensive. However, we
also observed that such users have more friends and followers,
more posting and dissemination activity (via hashtags and men-
tions). From this clearly distinctive behavior, what remains unclear
is how these users are handled by Twitter.
To shed more light on this aspect, in the next sections, we exam-
ine further the GGers by introducing a new factor characterizing
each one: their Twitter account status. In particular, we investigate
the following questions:
• What is the twitter account status and how do we measure it?
What does it imply for a user and what is the breakdown for
dierent statuses between GGers and random users (§ 5.1)?
• What are the characteristics of suspended users and users who
deleted their Twitter account (§ 5.2)?
• What are the characteristics of users who remain active on
Twitter, but should have been suspended (§ 5.3)?
• Can we emulate the Twitter account suspension mechanism
(§ 5.4)?
Methodology. To answer these questions, we analyze users on
features presented in the previous section, under the following two
general categories:
• emotional attributes: sentiment, 6 emotions (anger, disgust, fear,
joy, sadness, surprise), oensive words, uppercases, emoticons;
• activity attributes: account age, number of posts, user partici-
pating lists, mentions, followers and friends count.
We apply unsupervised and supervised methods to validate that
these features are useful to study and compare their distributions
to identify dierences between types of users and account statuses.
5.1 Status of Gamergate Accounts on Twitter
A Twitter user can be in one of the following three statuses: (i) ac-
tive, (ii) deleted, or (iii) suspended. Typically, Twitter suspends an
account (temporarily or even permanently, in some cases) if it has
been hijacked/compromised, is considered spam/fake, or if it is
abusive [1]. A user account is deleted if the user himself, for his
own personal reasons, deactivates his account.
Figure 3: Distribution of baseline and GG users in Twitter statuses.
In order to examine the dierences between these three statuses
in relation to the GGers and baseline users, we selected a 10%
random sample of 33k users from both the GG (5k) and baseline
(28k) users to check their Twitter status, one month after the initial
data collection. The status of each user’s account was checked
using a mechanism that queried the Twitter API for each user, and
examined the error code responses returned: code 63 corresponds
to a suspended user account and code 50 corresponds to a deleted
one.
From Figure 3 we observe that both categories of users tend to be
suspended rather than deleting their accounts by choice. However,
baseline users are more prone to suspension (20%) and deletion
(13%) of their accounts, in contrast to the GGers (9% and 5%, respec-
tively). The higher number of the suspended and deleted accounts
of the baseline users in comparison to GGers is in accordance with
the behavior observed in Figure 2a which shows that the GGers
have been in the platform for a longer period than baseline users,
meaning they appear to be more compliant to Twitter rules.
Nevertheless, this disproportional rate of suspensions for random
users with respect to GGers remains a surprising nd. Given our
previous observations on their posting behavior, it is unexpected
that several of such users are allowed to continue posting tweets.
Indeed, a small portion of these users may be spammers who are
dicult to detect and lter out. That said, Twitter has made signi-
cant eorts in addressing spam accounts and we suspect there is a
higher presence of such accounts in the baseline dataset, since the
GG dataset is more hyper-focused around a somewhat niche topic.
These eorts are less apparent when it comes to the bullying and
aggressive behavior phenomena observed on Twitter in general,
e.g., [28, 33], and in our present study of GG users, in particular.
However, recently, Twitter has increased its eorts to combat the
existing harassment cases, for instance, by preventing suspended
users from creating new accounts [26], or temporarily limiting
users for abusive behavior [32]. Such eorts constitute initial steps
to deal with the ongoing war among the abusers, their victims, and
online bystanders. Next, we further analyze the available data to
identify metrics that can provide explanations for understanding
the Twitter suspension mechanism.
5.2 Who is suspended and who is deleted?
To understand how suspended and deleted users dier, here we
compare each of these user statuses for both GG and baseline users
considering the previously described dimensions, i.e., their emo-
tional and activity based proles.
(a) Anger distribution. (b) Disgust distribution. (c) Oensive distribution. (d) Joy distribution.
(e) Sadness distribution. (f) Fear distribution. (g) Sentiment distribution. (h) Uppercases distribution.
Figure 4: CDF plots for the suspended and deleted users considering the emotional attributes: (a) Anger, (b) Disgust, (c) Oensive, (d) Joy, (e)
Sadness, (f) Fear, (g) Sentiment, (h) Uppercases.
Since users are suspended because their activity violates Twitter
rules, and with the assumption that this detection system is con-
sistent across users, we would expect GGers and baseline users to
present similar behavior, or in some cases, we would expect GGers
to be more extreme than baseline users. On the other hand, users
who delete their accounts could present a variety of behavioral
attributes, as this decision is user-based; i.e., there is a large num-
ber of confounding factors as to why the user decided to delete
his account. Based on Figures 4 and 5, we observe that there are
substantial dierences among the suspended baseline users and
GGers, and the deleted baseline and GGers.
Sentiment, Emotions, and Oensive language. Concerning
the emotional and sentiment attributes, we observe dierent behav-
iors. For instance Figures 4a, 4b, and 4c show that suspended GGers
are expressing more aggressive (D = 0.76, p < 0.01) and repulsive
(D = 0.23, p < 0.01) emotions, and oensive language (use of hate
words), in comparison to suspended baseline users. Interestingly,
suspended GGers also post more joyful tweets (Figure 4d, D = 0.44
and p < 0.01), and even though 30% of them post more negative
sentiment tweets than baseline users, the rest of the suspended
GGers are more positive than baseline suspended users (Figure 4g,
D = 0.29 and p < 0.01). The posting of more aggressive and joyful
tweets from suspended GGers contradicts the behavior observed
earlier when studying the overall dataset of GGers (i.e., regardless
of account status) which implies that such a deviation from the
norm could be a reason for suspension. Since extreme aggression,
negative, and oensive language is abusive behavior, we would
expect higher suspension rates for the GGers than baseline users.
In a similar fashion, we look at the deleted GGers and observe
that they exhibit higher anger in their posted tweets than the deleted
baseline users (Figure 4a, D = 0.39 and p < 0.01), but lower than
the suspended GGers. They exhibit less joy (Figure 4d, D = 0.14
and p < 0.01), but more sadness (Figure 4e, D = 0.15, and p <
0.01) and fear (Figure 4f, D = 0.13 and p < 0.01) than the deleted
baseline users and suspended GGers. On the other hand, they tweet
with sentiment which is more negative than suspended GGers and
deleted baseline users (Figure 4g, D = 0.58 and p < 0.01). Finally,
they type less in all uppercase than deleted baseline users (Figure 4h,
D = 0.56 and p < 0.01), but more than suspended GGers. Based on
these observations and in accordance with the higher expression of
fear, it seems that deleted GGers are more emotionally introverted
users, and might be deleting their accounts to protect themselves
from negative behaviors/attention.
Age, Followers, and Friends. As far as the activity patterns, Fig-
ure 5 shows that suspended and deleted GGers are more active
overall than baseline users. In particular, we observe (Figure 5a)
that users who delete their accounts (GGers or baseline), have been
on the platform longer than suspended users (D = 0.51, p < 0.01).
Surprisingly, for the limited amount of time their account was ac-
tive, suspended GGers managed to become more popular and thus
have more followers (Figures 5b) and friends (Figure 5c) than the
suspended baseline users (D = 0.64 and 0.60, p < 0.01 for both com-
parisons) and deleted GGers and baseline users. The fact that the
deleted users (GGers or baseline) have fewer friends and followers
than suspended GGers, implies they have less support from their
social network. On the contrary, high popularity for suspended
GGers could have helped them attract and create additional activity
on Twitter and could be a reason for delaying the suspension of
such highly engaging, and even inammatory, users.
Posts, Lists, and Favorites. Figures 5d, 5e, and 5f show the dis-
tribution of the number of posts, lists, and favorites, respectively,
made by suspended GGers and baseline users, as well as deleted
users. Overall, we observe suspended GGers to be more active than
baseline users, with more posts, higher participation in lists, and
(a) Account age distribution. (b) Followers distribution.
(c) Friends distribution. (d) Posts distribution.
(e) Lists distribution. (f) Favorites distribution.
Figure 5: CDF plots for the suspended and deleted users consider-
ing activity attributes: (a) Account age, (b) Followers, (c) Friends, (d)
Posts, (e) Lists, (f) Favorites.
more tweets favorited (D = 0.24, D = 0.74, D = 0.27, p < 0.01
for all comparisons). However, deleted GGers exhibit the highest
activity in comparison to deleted baseline users (D = 0.18, D = 0.58,
D = 0.17, p < 0.01 for all comparisons) as well as compared to
suspended GGers.
Overall, deleted GGers appear to have been very active prior
to their account deletion, have exhibited signs of distress and fear,
and have shown, through their high posting activity, their anger,
reduced joy, and negative sentiment. However, their social network
(ego-network of friends and followers) was either unsupportive, or
just too small to provide the emotional support needed to block
verbal attacks and aggression by other users who were involved
in the GG controversy, and this overall hostile environment may
have led them to delete their accounts. Suspended users, however,
managed to become highly popular in the platform in a short period
of time and probably engaged in bullying and aggressive behaviors
intense enough to lead to their suspension.
5.3 Who should be suspended?
In the previous paragraphs, we analyzed the behavior of GGers
and baseline users, and compared them with respect to the status
of their accounts (active, deleted, and suspended). Furthermore,
we observed that an important portion of the GGers remains ac-
tive despite exhibiting, in some cases, abnormal behavior. Here,
we organize users in groups to understand what homogeneity or
commonalities users have, e.g., if they all tweet with many hate
words, negative sentiment, or anger. By studying the heterogeneity
of the identied groups, we then mark any diversity that users ex-
hibit, and examine whether such a diversity could justify Twitter’s
tolerance against their abnormal behavior.
To group users who are highly similar over the available features
studied, we use an unsupervised clustering method. After the
clustering task, we label the top 3 groupings created that cover the
majority of users under a specic status. We also investigate if the
remaining clusters could be used to classify more users under the
suspended status.
Clustering approach. Initially we extract both emotional and
activity related attributes for the 33k users and proceed with a clus-
tering process (separately on baseline and GG users, since we have
seen a totally dierent behavior) in order to understand the com-
monalities behind Twitter’s dierent statuses. We useK-means [21],
an unsupervised learning algorithm, where each user in the dataset
is associated to the nearest cluster centroid out of the K clusters in
total. Each user x is assigned to a cluster considering its distance
from the K cluster centroids C as follows: argminci ∈C dist (ci ,x )2.
In our case, dist is the standard squared Euclidean distance in the
N -dimensions used. When all users are assigned to a cluster, the
algorithm proceeds with a re-calculation of the K new cluster cen-
troids and a new binding of users to the nearest new centroids is
made. The re-calculation of the clusters’ centroids is done by taking
the mean value of the feature vector for users included in that cen-
troid’s cluster. This process is completed when no change in cluster
membership is observed, or a maximum number of iterations is
reached.
Detecting the optimal number of clusters. In K-means the
number of clusters to be extracted should be known a priori. To
nd an appropriate number of clusters, one can run the K-means
clustering algorithm for a range of K values and compare the re-
sults with respect to compactness of clusters and distance between
centroids. A more sophisticated approach is to build upon the
Expectation-maximization algorithm (EM) [14] which identies
naturally occurring clusters. The EM algorithm is an ecient
method to estimate the maximum likelihood in the presence of
missing or hidden data. Thus, given some observed data y, the
EM algorithm attempts to nd the parameters θ that maximize the
probability:θ = argmaxθ loдp (y |θ ). Then, for the unobserved or
missing data x , we estimate θ that maximizes the likelihood, l , of x :
l (θ ) =
∑
x p (x ,y;θ ).
Clustering tendency ofGamergaters. Considering the GG users
based on the EM algorithm, we ended up with 3 clusters for the
emotional attributes and 8 clusters for the activity-related attributes.
We see that some clusters are “easily” labeled due to the majority of
users being one type of status. Table 1 (Table 2) shows the distribu-
tion of the GGers in the 3 (8) clusters which have been characterized
as either active, deleted, or suspended using the Twitter status, and
considering the emotional (activity)-based attributes. As the GG
Status -> Cluster # active # deleted # suspended
active 1 2,429 139 135
deleted 2 258 11 33
suspended 3 1,615 87 260
Table 1: Distribution of GG users in 3 clusters and the assigned label
based on majority participation (emotional-related features).
Status -> Cluster # active # deleted # suspended
active 1 825 11 5
deleted 2 66 125 8
suspended 3 440 18 324
4 57 0 1
5 757 27 56
6 692 11 5
7 725 32 22
8 740 13 7
Table 2: Distribution of GG users in 8 clusters and the assigned label
based on majority participation (activity-related features).
Status-> Cluster # active # deleted # suspended
active 1 4,999 1,501 658
deleted 2 1,984 392 439
suspended 3 4,200 690 3,832
4 3,333 373 134
5 1,308 358 120
6 1,030 169 162
7 1,525 133 257
8 433 85 71
Table 3: Distribution of baseline users in 8 clusters and the assigned
label based on majority participation (emotional-related features).
dataset tends to contain a larger proportion of bullying and ag-
gressive behavior phenomena, one would expect that based on the
emotional-related features, the clustering results would be in better
accordance to the Twitter status labels. However, we observe that
using the activity-related features results in those clusters better
matching the Twitter applied status labels.
Clustering tendency for baseline users. We now perform the
same analysis on the baseline users, looking for any dierences of
the suspension mechanism from GGers. Here, the EM algorithm
converged on 8 clusters for both the emotional and activity-related
attributes. Tables 3 and 4 show these distributions, respectively.
We observe that for both feature sets, the cluster assigned the
suspended label is clearly distinct, with substantially more users as
members. Deleted users are harder to t: they do not seem to be
primarily present in a single cluster, however, the activity-based
features do seem to better cluster them. This indicates that further
analysis on deleted users should be conducted.
In general, and as expected, the clustering is not perfect in either
of the two datasets: the clusters are fairly diverse with respect
to users from the three statuses. This is mainly because of two
reasons: (i) the majority of users are active and since they exhibit a
wide range of behaviors, they would be included in various clusters,
(ii) some of these active users should probably be suspended, but
the suspension mechanism failed to detect them. Such users should
Status-> Cluster # active # deleted # suspended
active 1 6,885 1,121 651
deleted 2 882 1,124 63
suspended 3 4,942 574 3,765
4 1,580 156 74
5 2,733 594 78
6 858 51 51
7 142 24 2
8 787 57 989
Table 4: Distribution of baseline users in 8 clusters and the assigned
label based on majority participation (activity-related features).
(a) Sentiment distribution. (b) Joy distribution.
Figure 6: CDF plots of baseline users for the suspended and an un-
named cluster considering the emotional attributes: (a) Sentiment,
(b) Joy.
(a) Posts distribution. (b) Favorites distribution.
(c) Followers distribution. (d) Friends distribution.
Figure 7: CDF plots of baseline users for the suspended and an un-
named cluster considering the activity attributes: (a) Posts, (b) Fa-
vorites, (c) Followers, (d) Friends.
be placed under evaluation for possible suspension. To this end, we
study the properties of the users included in each of the unnamed
clusters (in emotional or activity-based clusterings), for baseline
and GG users, and propose clusters which could be considered
candidate for suspending users.
For instance, studying the unlabeled clusters of Table 2, there
is the cluster #5 (with 757 active, 27 deleted, and 56 suspended
users) where GGers show similar activity patterns to those of the
suspended cluster indicating that there are active users who could
be possible candidates for suspension. These users are similar to
those of the suspended cluster: their accounts are pretty old and
exhibit intense activity in terms of tweet posting (mean = 23, 664,
median = 17, 510). Also, they show similar patterns in terms of the
favorited tweets and lists with the GGers of the suspended clus-
ter. Quite suspicious is the unlabeled cluster #7 with 1, 525 active,
133 deleted, and 257 suspended users in Table 3: the cluster mem-
bers show signs of negative behavior by using oensive language
and negativity in their tweets (Figure 6a) and lower levels of joy
(Figure 6b).
Another unnamed cluster (#6) which could be agged as sus-
picious for suspension is the one with 858 active, 51 deleted, and
suspended users in Table 4. Here, both the suspended and #6 clus-
ters show similar activity in terms of list participation. Quite inter-
estingly, even though users in these clusters tend to have similar
account age on Twitter, there are important dierences in the num-
ber of their posted (Figure 7a) and favorited (Figure 7b) tweets. Such
a disproportionality in the number of posted/favorited tweets (i.e.,
quite increased activity) and their lifetime on Twitter could be an
indication of spam users. Finally, focusing again on the same set
of clusters (Table 4), cluster #8 shows abnormal and consequently
suspicious behavior. The majority of its users have been suspended,
but it also includes a lot of active users. If we compare the pop-
ularity of users in cluster #8 with the users from the suspended
cluster, we nd the suspended cluster users being more popular in
terms of their followers (Figure 7c) and friends (Figure 7d). How-
ever, the users in cluster #8 have posted a relatively large number
of tweets (the mean and standard deviation values are 547.15 and
640.63, respectively), considering their short lifetime. Such “strange”
behavior could be indicative of spammer accounts.
5.4 Emulating the suspension engine
Having gained an overview of the homogeneity or commonalities
users have in accordance to their Twitter status, here we investigate
if the features we have analyzed so far are meaningful and correlated
with account statuses, and more importantly, if they can be used to
automatically classify users. To this end, we perform a supervised
classication task using the three statuses as labels in an attempt to
emulate the Twitter suspension engine. We study the two types of
users (GGers and baseline users) separately to understand if such
features are more predictive of one or the other.
For the classication task, we test several tree-based algorithms
as we nd them to perform best (J48, LADTree, LMT, NBTree,
Random Forest (RF), and Functional Tree). Overall, tree-based
classiers are built from three types of nodes: (i) the root node, with
no incoming edges, (ii) the internal nodes, with just one incoming
edge and two or more outgoing edges, and (iii) the leaf node, with
one incoming edge and no outgoing edges. The root and internal
nodes correspond to feature test conditions that separate data based
on their characteristics, while the leaf nodes correspond to the
available classes. In the end, we select RF [27], as it achieved the
best results with respect to time for training without overtting
Prec. Rec. ROC
active 0.898 0.982 0.747
deleted 0.667 0.008 0.550
suspended 0.669 0.407 0.865
overall (avg.) 0.867 0.886 0.747
(a) Emotional-related features
Prec. Rec. ROC
active 0.937 0.973 0.886
deleted 0.725 0.489 0.804
suspended 0.742 0.591 0.925
overall (avg.) 0.910 0.917 0.886
(b) Activity-related features
Table 5: Classication results based on the GG dataset.
Prec. Rec. ROC
active 0.756 0.946 0.742
deleted 0.197 0.022 0.674
suspended 0.803 0.598 0.882
overall (avg.) 0.692 0.755 0.761
(a) Emotional-related features
Prec. Rec. ROC
active 0.806 0.943 0.826
deleted 0.570 0.248 0.806
suspended 0.892 0.718 0.937
overall (avg.) 0.792 0.807 0.846
(b) Activity-related features
Table 6: Classication results based on baseline dataset.
the dataset. We test the two categories of features (emotional and
activity-based) separately, as well as combined. Based on Tables 5
and 6 in both the GG and baseline datasets, we observe that by
considering the activity-related features, the precision, recall, and
ROC (weighted area under the ROC curve) values are always higher
at both the class level and overall across classes. Adding all features
together the scores are a little better than the emotional-related
features (omitted due to space).
We remark that this classication task is not ideal for two main
reasons: (i) we only use a subset of data and extract a subset of
features from the ones that Twitter has available for making deci-
sions with its status mechanism, and (ii) we only use a fairly simple,
but robust, classication algorithm to attempt this task. We sus-
pect that Twitter computes many more features per user to assess
their behavior, as well as using highly sophisticated algorithms
for user suspension. However, given these caveats, we show that
it is possible to approximate the status mechanism, and perform
very well with respect to standard machine learning metrics: we
achieve 0.7− 0.91 precision, 0.76− 0.92 recall, and 0.75− 0.89 ROC.
From these preliminary results, we conclude that our features are
meaningful in studying such user behaviors, and probably useful
in detecting what status a user should be given by Twitter.
6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper we have performed a large-scale comparative study
of abusive accounts on Twitter, aiming to understand their char-
acteristics and how they dier from regular accounts. Specically,
we focused on a Twitter dataset revolving around the Gamergate
controversy which led to many incidents of cyberbullying and cy-
beraggression on various gaming and social media platforms. We
studied the properties of users tweeting about GG, the content they
post, and the dierences in their behavior compared to typical Twit-
ter users. We found that users involved in this controversy were
existing Twitter users that were probably drawn to the controversy.
In fact, their familiarity with Twitter could be the reason that GG
exploded in the rst place. We also discovered that while the subject
of their tweets is seemingly aggressive and hateful, GGers do not
exhibit common expressions of online anger, and in fact primarily
dier from typical users in that their tweets are less joyful. This
aligns with the viewpoint of the GG supporters who claim that they
never agreed to the aggressive methods used in this campaign [23],
which can result in a confusing expression of anger manifestation.
GGers tend to be organized in groups, and in fact they participate
also in face-to-face meetings to create stronger bonds, which also
reects on the higher number of followers and friends they have
in relation to typical users, despite their seemingly anti-social be-
havior. Also, we discover that GGers are seemingly more engaged
than typical Twitter users, which is an indication as to how and
why this controversy is still ongoing.
To better understand how these abusive users are handled by
Twitter, we performed an in-depth analysis of the status of accounts
posting about GG and typical Twitter users. Surprisingly, we found
that GGers are disproportionally not suspended with respect to
random users, which is rather unexpected given their hateful and
aggressive postings. Therefore, we investigated users’ properties
with respect to their account status to understand what may have
led to suspension of some of them, but not all of them. Even though
suspended GGers are expressing more aggressive and repulsive
emotions, and oensive language than random users, they tend
to become more popular and more active in terms of their posted
tweets. This popularity could be the reason for the delayed suspen-
sion from the Twitter mechanism, a situation that seems to have
changed lately, considering the new actions taken by Twitter itself,
e.g., [26, 32].
We also studied the GG users who deleted their account. These
users demonstrate the highest activity in comparison to other users
(deleted or suspended). Overall, such deleted users exhibit signs of
distress, fear, and sadness, and have probably showed these emo-
tions through their high posting activity lled with anger, reduced
joy, and negative sentiment. We also found that such users have
small social ego-networks, which may have been unsupportive or
too small to help them deal with aggressive attacks by other GGers
before deleting their account.
Finally, we performed an unsupervised machine learning analy-
sis to detect clusters of users who, though currently active, could
be considered for suspension as they exhibit similar behaviors with
already suspended users. Our ndings are a rst step towards un-
derstanding better, and at large-scale, the behavior of abusive users
in online social media such as Twitter, their victims and what may
have led them to delete their account, and propose supervised meth-
ods to detect suspicious users whose accounts should be evaluated
for suspension. As part of future work, we plan to perform a more
in-depth study of the Gamergate controversy and further compare
it with other organized groups that exhibit online aggressive and
abusive behaviors.
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